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Supreme Court case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), grants government officials
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Since the latter part of the last decade, there has been an increasing concern about the
disproportional amount of unarmed African American men, women, and children being killed by
the police. To make matters worse, the officers involved in the shootings rarely face criminal
charges nor are they able to be sued in civil cases because they were protected under qualified
immunity. Such killings have sparked outrage that has fueled movements such as Black Lives
Matter (henceforth BLM) and hashtags on social media such as #HandsUpDon’tShoot,
#ICan’tBreathe, #BreonnaTaylor. When one breaks down the events that have taken place, it is
not difficult to identify the source of this outrage.
The year 2014 seemingly started it all. In July, while on the street in New York City,
Eric Garner, a particularly large (6’2”, 395lbs), African American man, was allegedly selling
loose cigarettes (Baker, Goodman, & Mueller, 2015). When NYPD officers confronted and
attempted to arrest him, he was put in a chokehold and pinned down by multiple officers (Baker,
Goodman, & Mueller, 2015). The ordeal was caught on cell phone video, and viewers can
clearly hear Garner repeatedly (11 times) exclaim, “I can’t breathe!” (Baker, Goodman, &
Mueller, 2015). Garner eventually lost consciousness and died at the hospital (Queally, 2014).
In August 2014, the shooting of Michael Brown occurred in Ferguson, Missouri (Mejia,
2014). According to Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson Police Department, while
responding to a theft in process, Brown was reaching for his gun while Wilson was in his police
car (Mejia, 2014). Wilson alleges that Brown charged at him, leading him to shoot his gun at
Brown several times (Mejia, 2014). Dorian Johnson, who was with Brown, disputes this
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narrative and says that Wilson started the altercation by grabbing Brown’s neck when he was
next to the vehicle, prompting Brown to flee, turn around, and raise his hands in surrender before
Wilson shot at him multiple times (Mejia, 2014). In the investigation of the incident, there were
several conflicting eyewitness statements with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation finding that Officer Wilson acted in self-defense—
even though Brown was unarmed— (Berman, 2014). The incident sparked protests and civil
unrest in Ferguson, repeating the phrase “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” which was met with a
militarized response from area law enforcement (Tribune wire reports, 2014). Wilson was later
called to a grand jury where he was not indicted (Sneed, 2014); this was only the beginning.
A mere two months later, in Cleveland, Ohio, Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old African
American boy was killed by Officer Timothy Loehmann of the Cleveland Police Department
(McCarthy, 2014). Initially, Loehmann, along with his partner, Frank Garmback, were
dispatched to the call being advised that there was a male pointing a pistol at random people
(McCarthy, 2014). The 9-1-1 caller said that the gun was “probably fake” and that it was
“probably a juvenile”, although none of that was revealed by the dispatcher on the original call
for service. As seen by surveillance footage, Loehmann shot at Rice almost immediately after
arriving at the scene (McCarthy, 2014). Rice was not pointing the gun at the time of the officers’
arrival; his hands were in his jacket pockets, and the toy gun was in his waistband (McCarthy,
2014). When responding to a command to show his hands, Rice took his hands out of his
pockets and, before he had a chance to finish the motion, he was shot (McCarthy, 2014). He
died the next day in the hospital (McCarthy, 2014). When the case was brought to a grand jury,
they declined to indict the officers (Fantz, Almasy, & Shoichet, 2015).
As Table 1 shows, the cases only continued to increase in frequency and inconsistency in
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Table 1: Notable Cases from 2015-2019
Year

Victim

Location

Situation

Punishment

2015

Deven Guilford

Eaton Co., MI

Shot by Sgt. Jonathan Frost in a traffic stop over Frost’s
headlights a

No charges

2015

Walter Scott

North Charleston, SC

Shot in the back while fleeing from by Ofc. Michael
Slager (caught on camera) b

2016

Daniel Shaver

Mesa, AZ

Shot in hotel hallway by Ofc. Philip Brailsford. Shaver
was on his knees pleading for his life when he was shot c

2016

Alton Sterling

Baton Rouge, LA

2016

Philando Castile

Falcon Heights, MN

Shot by Ofc. Blane Salamoni while he and Ofc. Howie
Lake II had him pinned down. Sterling was thought to be
reaching for a gun (caught on camera) d
Shot by Ofc. Jeronimo Yanez while performing a traffic
stop. Castile was thought to be reaching for a gun.
(incident was broadcasted on Facebook Live) f

2016

Terence Crutcher

Tulsa, OK

2018

Botham Jean

Dallas, TX

Shot by Ofc. Betty Shelby after Crutcher approached his
stalled SUV and not complying to Shelby’s commands g

20 years in prison
(second-degree
murder)
Acquitted
(second-degree
murder)
No charges e
Acquitted
(manslaughter,
two counts
endangerment)
Acquitted

Was shot in his own home by neighbor, Ofc. Amber
10 years
Guyger, who was off duty, but still in uniform. Guyger
(murder)
alleged that she had mistaken him for an intruder in her
apartment h
2019 Atatiana Jefferson Fort Worth, TX
Was shot in her own home through a window by Aaron
Indicted
Dean after Dean was responding to a non-emergency call
(murder)
about Jefferson’s door being open. Jefferson was armed
but acted in self-defense. i
Notes: (a) Balko, 2015; (b) Dwyer, 2017; (c) Friedersdorf, 2018; (d) Belinger, Valencia, & Almasy, 2016; (e) Fausset & Blinder,
2018; (f) Berman, 2017; (g) Karimi, Levenson, & Gamble, 2017; (h) Ortiz, 2019a; (i) Ortiz, 2019b
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punishment.
Concern over the deaths of unarmed Black people at the hands of the police came back to
the forefront in 2020 following the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. In March,
Taylor, 26, who was an emergency room technician in Louisville, KY, was shot to death in her
home after Louisville police executed a no-knock warrant searching for her ex-boyfriend, who
was allegedly using her home to sell drugs (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021).
Taylor was lying in bed with her boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, when they heard a battering ram
strike their front door (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021). When they both called out
to see who it was at the door, no one answered, so when the door was broken down, Walker fired
his gun, striking an officer in the thigh (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021). In
response to the initial gunshot, several gunshots were fired into the residence, hitting Taylor; she
died shortly thereafter (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021). The man in question,
Jamarcus Glover, was later arrested (unrelated to Taylor’s death) and said that Taylor was not
involved with the operation, further purporting her innocence (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & BogelBurroughs, 2021).
Since the incident, there have been protests and outcry on social media and in-person
demanding the officers involved be held accountable. In June, the Louisville council passed a
law that banned no-knock warrants in the city and named it after Taylor (Reiss & Waldrop,
2020), but that was before any charges were brought before the officers involved. It was not
until September that the officers were brought before a grand jury, only for one of them to be
charged with wanton endangerment (Miller & Tobin, 2020). In accordance with Kentucky state
law, “A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he wantonly engages in conduct
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which creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person” which is
a Class D felony (Miller & Tobin, 2020). In short, the officer was only being charged for the
rounds that missed Taylor. It was not until January 2021 that Officer Joshua Jayne (who secured
the no-knock warrant) and Detective Myles Cosgrove (the shooter) were fired from the
department (Booker, 2021).
Two months following Taylor’s death, George Floyd was killed. The event took place in
Minneapolis, MN, after Floyd was accused of using a counterfeit $20 bill (Hill et al., 2020).
Multiple cell phone videos displayed the ever-escalating ordeal of his arrest. Floyd appears
cooperative and was handcuffed but a struggle ensued when he was being put inside the car (Hill
et al., 2020). Eventually, Floyd was pulled out of the car onto the street and laid face down, still
handcuffed (Hill et al., 2020). Bystanders were still filming the arrest mere feet away and
witnessed three officers holding down a defenseless Floyd while one stood by and watched (Hill
et al., 2020). The arrest concluded with Officer Derrick Chauvin’s knee on Floyd’s neck for
eight minutes and forty-six seconds, all while Floyd is pleading for the officer to get off of him,
exclaiming multiple times that he could not breathe (Hill et al., 2020)—a call back to Eric
Garner. As bystanders are watched and filmed, they too pled with Chauvin to take the knee off,
even trying to physically intervene before being blocked off by the assisting officers standing
idly by. Floyd eventually lost consciousness (around the seven-minute and twenty-six second
mark) and died with a knee in his neck; he was 46 (Hill et al., 2020). The video of the incident
went viral on social media and news outlets alike, with outrage felt worldwide.
However, police relations among minority communities did not worsen overnight. From
the inception of slave patrols to the Civil Rights era, relations between the police and the African
American community has been contentious at best and shrouded in violence at worst.
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Furthermore, one mainstay of this tumultuous relationship has been the lack of accountability
faced by officers who “sadistically and maliciously” use force during arrests. The year 2014 was
not the start of this behavior—and subsequent acquittal—for law enforcement. Of the more
notable incidences, perhaps the most similar in response to those mentioned earlier would be that
of Rodney King. In 1991, King was driving under the influence in Los Angeles, CA, and led
police on a high-speed chase (Sastry & Bates, 2017). When the police finally stopped him and
attempted to arrest him, they “kicked him and beat him with batons for a reported 15 minutes”
while more officers stood by instigating the incident; the ordeal was also caught on camera
(Sastry & Bates, 2017). King suffered numerous injuries from the beating, including permanent
brain damage (Sastry & Bates, 2017). When it came time to discipline the officers involved over
a year later, the four officers involved were all acquitted (Sastry & Bates, 2017). That decision
left Los Angeles in shambles as a result of riots and unrest that occurred throughout the city
(Sastry & Bates, 2017). Although King survived to tell his story, unfortunately, others in his
position have not. Names like Amadou Diallo—a man who was shot at 41 times by four plainclothes officers of the New York Police Department in 1999 (Fritsch, 2000)—Kathryn
Johnston—an elderly woman who was shot in the execution of a no-knock warrant in Atlanta,
GA, (similar to Breonna Taylor) in 2006 (CNN, 2008)—and Sean Bell—who, among two other
friends, was shot at 50 times by New York Police Department after leaving his bachelor party in
2006 (Johnson, 2019)—have been immortalized in history as victims of police misconduct.
Although these cases are tragic, a partnering source of outrage is the lack of consistency
in holding the officers accountable. In the Diallo case, the four officers involved with seconddegree murder but were acquitted at trial (Fritsch, 2000); the officers involved in the Bell
incident met a similar fate and were also acquitted (Johnson, 2019). However, the cases of
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Kathryn Johnston and Breonna Taylor show the most inconsistency across parallels. Aside from
the shootings occurring in different states over a decade apart, the circumstances are nearly
identical. Yet, the officers involved in the Johnston case were tried and convicted, while those of
the Taylor case were charged with crimes unrelated to her death and only recently fired from
their department (Booker, 2021). Officers being fired, albeit a step in the right direction, is not
enough for many community members. In incidents that involve the officer drawing and firing
his/her gun, the common first step is to suspend them while the investigation is conducted. This
is meant to ensure the officer’s due process; however, it can appear to the public as leniency or
even a reward for the officer.
As much as the knee-jerk reaction desires for immediate termination, the removal of the
officer is only partially helpful. Often, the officers involved can be hired by another department.
For example, Officer Loehmann (shot and killed Tamir Rice) was hired by another Ohio
department four years after the incident (Vera, 2018). Perhaps the solution lies within the
standard operating procedures. If officers are trained under policies that better outline the proper
procedure, perhaps it could lessen the frequency of the incidences in the future. Unfortunately, it
is incredibly difficult to proactively outline every possible scenario that an officer would
encounter, and policies are often updated after an incident occurs (see e.g., Breonna’s Law; Reiss
& Waldrop, 2020).
As we scramble to find the solution, one that has emerged is the removal of the
application of qualified immunity from law enforcement. Qualified immunity, as defined by the
Supreme Court case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), grants government officials
performing discretionary functions immunity from civil suits unless the plaintiff shows that the
official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
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person would have known.” This legal principle is not exclusive to law enforcement nor is it
meant to intentionally stifle compensation for victims of police brutality. As it applies to law
enforcement, when officers are not found to have violated their protocol, they are protected from
being sued. The department itself can still be sued and often settle, but should they choose not to
settle, the officer would be protected. If qualified immunity is amended to no longer apply to
law enforcement, the threat of monetary loss on the part of the officer may serve as a powerful
deterrent to the unreasonable use of force.
Problem Statement
As cases of unarmed Black men and women being shot and/or brutalized by law
enforcement pile up, the lack of accountability creates an exponential cycle of injustice. When
combined with vague policies and officer discretion, qualified immunity protects officers from
personally being held accountable for their actions. To increase accountability, some have called
for doing away with such immunity policies; but it is unknown the breadth of the support for
such actions as well as the potential conditional nature of support for such efforts.
What to do with Qualified Immunity
There are credible concerns with retaining qualified immunity as well as with doing away
with it. On the one hand, outside of reform occurring elsewhere in policing, the pattern of
unaccountability would continue, and justice would constantly fall short. However, if qualified
immunity protections were stripped from law enforcement, the floodgates could open to the
frivolous lawsuits that such immunity was designed to prevent. For example, if in the execution
of a foot-chase, an officer runs through a prized garden and ruins it, the gardener could sue the
officer for damages, even if the officer was acting in the bounds of his duties. As it stands now,
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that officer would and should be protected from a suit such as that; but the problem arises when
officers are acting outside of their role as a law enforcement officer and their conduct is not (a)
explicitly codified or (b) the codified behavior is detrimental to those who are being policed.
Purpose of the Study
This study is meant to understand the support for removing qualified immunity as well as
consider how race may play a factor in the application and perception of qualified immunity.
Because qualified immunity is rarely discussed (and less so in social science publications),
gauging public opinion would assist in deciding how to deal with qualified immunity moving
forward.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Police Accountability
As civilians, we are held accountable by police officers; if a law is broken, the
expectation is that those responsible suffer the consequences, but from the appropriate source.
When the lawbreaker is a member of law enforcement, they also must be held accountable,
whether it be from their superiors, the community, a court of law, or a combination thereof.
Notable methods of police accountability include civilian review boards, Internal Affairs Units,
body-worn cameras, and criminal lawsuits.
Civilian Review Boards
As described by Udi Ofer in the Seton Hall Law Review (2016), “the concept behind a
civilian review board is a simple one: civilians and not police personnel should have the power to
investigate and make findings on police officer wrongdoing” (p. 1039). As the name suggests,
officers are reviewed by community members to hold them accountable. This method originated
in the 1940s but did not gain ground until the 1960s and 1970s, during the height of the Civil
Rights Era (Ofer, 2016). The Civil Rights Era was a period of increasing concerns about police
brutality and having a civilian review board was a way that community members believed they
could address this problem. Today, four different types of civilian review boards exist: (1) those
that investigate allegations and suggest discipline to the appropriate source, (2) those that review
the findings of internal investigations, (3) those that allow civilians to appeal the findings of
internal investigations and a board to review the process itself, and (4) those that serve as
auditors of police complaints (Ofer, 2016). To conclude his article, Ofer emphasizes the
importance of an effective civilian review board:
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Arguably, a weak civilian review board is worse than no civilian review board because it
gives the illusion of independent accountability but provides little to no accountability. A
weak civilian review board can lead to an increase in community resentment, as residents
go to the board to seek redress yet end up with little (p. 1052).
In an analysis of civilian review boards in Newark, NJ, Alecia McGregor (2016) shows
how politics may influence civilian review boards and, more broadly, police accountability.
Historically, Newark law enforcement has a tarnished past involving civil rights violations.
McGregor (2016) notes:
By most accounts, police-community tensions in Newark peaked in July of 1967, after
taxi driver John Smith was beaten and dragged into a police station by Newark police
officers. This event sparked a 5-day uprising that ultimately resulted in 26 deaths, 24 of
whom were African American civilians, and most were killed by police firearms (p. 144).
When met with advocacy for a civilian review board, then-mayor Hugo Addonizio (who was
Italian-American) was opposed to the idea (McGregor, 2016). Even as Addonizio was unseated
by Kenneth Gibson (African American) in 1970, there was still political opposition to a civilian
review board (McGregor, 2016). It was not until 1997, following the Rodney King incident and
a local incident involving Newark police, that there was political advocacy, when Mayor Sharpe
James endorsed civilian review boards only to walk it back in the face of police opposition
(McGregor, 2016). As racial tensions in Newark grew throughout the 1990s into the 2010s, a
civilian review board remained absent until 2015, when Mayor Ras Baraka implemented it via
executive order (McGregor, 2016). The 38-year gap across mayors between peak desire and
civilian review boards’ implementation reveals the struggle to change policies due to political
influence.
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Internal Affairs Units
As the name suggests, internal affairs units are designed to conduct investigations of
police officers from within. As defined by The Balance Careers’ Timothy Roufa (2019):
“In law enforcement, [Internal Affairs] is the department that investigates allegations of
wrongdoing by police currently serving on the force. Because they are investigating
fellow officers, the department is separated from the force-at-large and report to an
investigative board or the agency's chief. Law enforcement officers must be held to the
highest ethical standards. So, sometimes mistakes can rise to a level that requires a full
internal investigation and possibly severe discipline” (n.p.).
Theoretically, internal affairs units are an effective way for police to police themselves.
However, as Rachel Moran purports in her article in the Buffalo Law Review (2016), the concept
of internal affairs is a “farce” created by a combination of five elements: (1) citizens being
deterred by police departments to report misconduct, (2) failure to investigate reports, (3) biased
investigations that favor the officer, (4) reproachable excessive force investigations, and (5)
resistance to requiring serious discipline. A design flaw with internal affairs units is that the
officers conducting the investigation are not present during the precipitating incident. Before the
possibility of recording the police, filing a complaint with these investigative bodies often
created a case of the officer’s word against that of the complainant. However, Moran (2016)
provides an example of how video evidence expedites the investigation process:
The Seattle Police Department has also had a number of incidents in which police
officers used racial slurs against minorities, including one in which an officer was
recorded threatening to ‘beat the f’ing Mexican piss out of a suspect.’ Although multiple
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officers at the scene witnessed this incident, none reported it, and the police department
did not discipline the officer until a civilian bystander made public a video of the incident
(p. 866).
A common theme among most of the incidents mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis is that they
were caught on camera. Video evidence serves to fill the gaps in the narrative of police
misconduct and provide a clearer explanation as to why a complaint was filed. However, not
everyone has access to a recording device nor should they be expected to record every instance
of their daily lives. This issue is meant to be solved by body-worn cameras.
Body-Worn Cameras
After the events of 2014, there was an increase in support for police wearing body
cameras from officers, community members, and the courts (Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer,
2015). The recent increase in the use of body-worn cameras is one that is felt internationally, as
departments in the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and France have all tested the use of these
cameras prior to 2015 (Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer, 2015). Regarding accountability, bodyworn cameras are, as Coudert, Butin, and Le Métayer explain:
They act as a transparency mechanism, subjecting to scrutiny that so far was limited to
the parties to the interaction. Video surveillance is here targeted to specific events, places,
and people. Because it is mobile, it can happen everywhere, anytime. Its use is thus
highly intrusive into the privacy of both citizens, who see their encounters with police
documented, and police officers, who are being placed under (constant) monitoring
during the performance of their task (p. 754).
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Body-worn cameras have shown positive effects in reducing civilian complaints, as
observed in a 2015 study conducted by Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar, and Alex Sutherland in
the Journal of Quantitative Criminology. The experiment was conducted in Rialto, California,
and divided the officers into control and experimental groups, with the latter wearing cameras
(Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015).
The outcomes suggest a reduction in the total number of incidents of use-of-force
compared to control-conditions. We have also observed nearly ten times more citizens’
complaints in the 12-months prior to the experiment, compared to any of the three years
prior to the experiment (p. 25).
Criminal Lawsuits
Unfortunately, the footage from body-worn cameras is not a guaranteed smoking gun.
Often, the camera is not on or is only turned on at a time after contextual events have occurred.
Take the shooting of Samuel DuBose, for example. This incident happened in 2015 at the
University of Cincinnati. After Officer Ray Tensing pulled over DuBose for driving without a
front license plate, he asked for Dubose’s driver’s license, which he did not show (Coolidge,
Grasha, & Horn, 2016). When Tensing tried to open DuBose’s car door, DuBose pulled it shut
with his left hand while starting the ignition with his right hand while exclaiming, “I ain’t even
do nothing!” (Coolidge, Grasha, & Horn, 2016). In response, Tensing reached into the car with
his left hand, yelled, “Stop!” and fired a single shot into DuBose’s head (Coolidge, Grasha, &
Horn, 2016). The entire stop was caught on Tensing’s body-worn camera (Coolidge, Grasha, &
Horn, 2016). When the case came under adjudication, Tensing said that he was scared he was
going to be run over by DuBose when the car was started (Sewell, 2017)—despite the video
showing him on the side of the car (Coolidge, Grasha, & Horn, 2016). The case against Tensing
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was eventually dropped after multiple trials (Sewell, 2017). The University of Cincinnati
eventually settled for $5.3 million to DuBose’s family (Sewell, 2017).
While settling outside of court can provide a healthy compensation, the accountability of
the officer (or the lack thereof) is not addressed. It should not be in a police department’s best
interest to pay out millions of dollars each time one of its officers kills someone. Even when all
else fails (see previous methods of accountability), a judge and/or jury can determine the
punishment for the officer. However, as Kate Levine’s article in The Georgetown Law Journal
(2016) explains, criminally charging police officers rarely results in a conviction.
Prosecutors decline to charge officers who kill (often unarmed) suspects at an extremely
high rate. Although recordkeeping by the federal government has been extremely poor,
academics, citizens, and media outlets have begun their own collection of reports. A
thorough analysis by the Washington Post and researchers at Bowling Green State
University uncovered that, out of thousands of fatal shootings by law enforcement
officers since 2005, only fifty-four had been charged or indicted (pp. 763-764).
Given the close relationship between law enforcement and prosecutors, it can be incredibly
conflicting for the latter to pursue charges (Levine, 2016). Often, charges are not applied unless
in egregious offenses (Levine, 2016). Furthermore, those seeking justice through civilian
litigation of officers are met with a similar fate due to qualified immunity.
Legal History of Qualified Immunity
As previously iterated, qualified immunity is the legal protection from lawsuits granted to
government officials acting within their duties and its origins date back to 1896. In the case of
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), the authority of the Postmaster-General was called into
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question when he “was directly in the line of duty when…he informed claimants that they were
under no legal obligation to respect any transfer, assignment or power of attorney, which section
3477 of the Revised Statutes declared to be null and void.” The case established the following:
The same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for
judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising
from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions apply
to a large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments
when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law.
From there, qualified immunity was argued thrice more. The first of which was the case of Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), where the petitioner was the Acting Director of the Office of
Rent Stabilization, William G. Barr (not to be confused with the former Attorney General) and
issued a press release about the respondents, Matteo and Madigan, that received massive media
attention. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel and alleged malice on the part of Barr, but the
Court held that the petitioner's plea of absolute privilege in defense of the alleged libel must be
sustained (pp. 360 U. S. 564-578).
The second case of Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) involved the Department of
Agriculture. The respondent of this case alleged that individual members of the Department, “by
instituting unauthorized proceedings against him, they had violated various of his constitutional
rights.” The following is what happened through the lower courts:
The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as
federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the
scope of their authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants were
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entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state
government.
Furthermore, the case established that neither the Barr case nor the Spalding case supported the
petitioner’s contention of absolute immunity.
The case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) is how the current definition of
qualified immunity came about. The case itself involved President Nixon’s presidential aides
(represented as Harlow) who were alleged to have conspired to violate Fitzgerald’s rights
involved in the case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). Fitzgerald, a
management analyst within the Department of the Air Force under the Lyndon B. Johnson
administration, had testified before Congress about “cost overruns and unexpected technical
difficulties concerning the development of a particular airplane.” Following Nixon’s
inauguration, Fitzgerald was dismissed and alleged his dismissal as retaliation for his testimony.
The case was heard well after Nixon’s resignation and the Court found that Nixon had absolute
immunity for the actions alleged by Fitzgerald. When the case against Harlow was heard, the
Court found that qualified immunity applied to presidential aides as well as they did not clearly
violate Fitzgerald’s rights.
It is also worth distinguishing between absolute immunity (which the Butz case was
arguing) and qualified immunity. The former provides immunity regardless of the lawfulness of
the actions, while the latter only protects actions that followed the protocol. Law enforcement
officers are granted qualified immunity as their departments are operated under a codified set of
procedures. However, an issue arises when the protocols the officers follow are not specific
enough to provide a unanimous interpretation. For example, in 2004, Malaika Brooks, an
African American woman in Seattle, WA, was pulled over for speeding in a school zone. After
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refusing to sign her ticket, she was tasered three times and arrested. After the incident, Brooks’
case eventually was brought to the 9th Circuit panel, and “[t]hat court eventually sided with
Brooks, but also said the officers were immune to Brooks’ constitutional claim because the law
was ‘not sufficiently clear at the time of the incident’” (KOMO Staff, 2014). Incidents like that
show that even when the officers have been found to have acted unconstitutionally, qualified
immunity can tie the hands of the courts when assigning punishment.
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF RELEVANT THEORIES
Conflict Theory
Conflict theory might best be applied to help understand the use of qualified immunity in
policing. At its core, conflict theory assumes an unequal and coercive society. The power
dynamics that characterize this stratified system are reinforced by social institutions, such as law
and the police (Althusser, 1971). “Conflict theory holds that law and the mechanisms of its
enforcement are used by dominant groups in society to minimize threats to their interests posed
by those whom they label dangerous, especially minorities and the poor” (Petrocelli, Piquero, &
Smith, 2003; p. 1). In other words, theoretically, the laws are made to benefit those who write
them and to damage those “below them.” These are also the same groups who are likely to
experience force by the police (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998). Thus, these groups are most likely to
be the subjects of police abuse of power (Harring, 1983). Therefore, they are also the most
affected by the (mis)use of qualified immunity.
“Class, race, sex, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics that denote social positions in
society determine who gets apprehended and punished. Thus, the economically and
socially disadvantaged groups of lower class, minorities, youth, women, and others will
be similarly disadvantaged and differently processed through the criminal justice system”
(Akers, Sellers, & Jennings, 2017; p. 212).
The laws that conflict theorists point to are not explicitly against a certain group of people but
instead set parameters that impact only a specific group of people. As early conflict theorist
George Vold proposed in his book Theoretical Criminology (1958):
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[T]he whole political process of law making, law breaking, and law enforcement
becomes a direct reflection of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between interest
groups and their more general struggles for control of the police power of the state.
Those who produce legislative majorities win control over the police power and dominate
the policies that decide who is likely to be involved in violation of the law (pp. 208-209).
Furthermore, the verbiage of the laws that are passed does not explicitly target a certain
population but rather appears neutral and equitable. For example, a policy that is meant to target
those of lower socioeconomic status would not contain rhetoric like, “If you make less than $X,
you can only vote at times your employer will require you to work.” Instead, the policy would
say, “Based on your address, the only polling place you can cast your ballot is here,” which,
superficially, is equal, but when applied across all socioeconomic statuses, the policy is applied
differently; socioeconomic status and convenience of polling places share a positive relationship
(Barreto, Cohen-Marks, & Woods, 2009). While voter suppression is an oasis for conflict
theorists, there are other ways the theory can apply.
As applied to modern American government, conflict theory would classify the laws
written by the legislature as detrimental to those who do not write them. For example, in 2017,
then-President Donald Trump and his administration passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).
The act was designed to lower the taxes of Americans but also had a built-in delayed tax
increase—set to trigger in 2021—that would adversely affect those who make under $75,000 a
year (Stiglitz, 2020). At the time of Stiglitz’s (2020) opinion piece, about 65% of taxpayers fall
under that threshold. As conflict theory explains, Trump’s policy is meant to target those lower
on the socioeconomic ladder by taxing them more and effectively allowing the rich to get richer.
Since the act was passed in 2017, as Stiglitz (2020) theorizes, “They [Trump and his allies]
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surmised—correctly, so far—that if they waited to add the tax increases until after the 2020
election, few of the people most affected were likely to remember who was responsible” (n.p.),
effectively dodging responsibility from a court of public opinion.
Turning back to policing, as Chambliss and Seidman (1971, p. 269 quoted in Petrocelli,
Piquero, & Smith, 2003), summarize, conflict theorists view law enforcement through the
following propositions:
1. The agencies of law enforcement are bureaucratic organizations.
2. An organization and its members tend to substitute for the official goals and norms of
the organization’s ongoing policies and activities that will maximize rewards and
minimize the strains on the organization.
3. This goal substitution is made possible by:
a. The absence of motivation on the part of the role-occupants to resist pressures
toward goal substitution;
b. The pervasiveness of discretionary choices permitted by the substantive
criminal law and the norms defining the roles of the members of law
enforcement agencies; and
c. The absence of effective sanctions for the norms defining roles in those
agencies.
4. Law enforcement agencies depend on political organizations for resource allocation.
5. Organizations will minimize strains on themselves by processing those who are
politically weak and powerless, while refraining from processing those who are
politically powerful.
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6. Therefore, it may be expected that law enforcement agencies will process a
disproportionately high number of the politically weak and powerless, while ignoring
the violations of those with power (p. 2).
These propositions argue that law enforcement officers give those who do not hold power over
them more attention than those who do hold such power. Often, the placement of power aligns
with the races of the officer and suspects, with white people historically holding more power
(Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003). “[T]he police have a lower threshold of suspicion for
Blacks as opposed to Whites, which manifests itself in the police having ‘one trigger for Whites,
another for Blacks’” (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; p. 3).
As it pertains to qualified immunity, conflict theory would posit that laws surrounding
qualified immunity are written by those in power and benefit civil servants, who hold power over
the general public, in such a way that if something goes awry, qualified immunity protects these
civil servants, arguing that these actors were merely “doing their job.” Since qualified immunity
protections are given to those who have followed the written protocol (or rather “not to have
violated it”), problematic and unspecific verbiage can afford protections for actions that would
appear otherwise improper. Furthermore, in cases without precedent, such protections are
granted as well.
The issue is further exacerbated when qualified immunity is applied to law enforcement.
For example, in the case of Corbitt v. Vickers, No. 17-15566 (11th Cir. 2019), the defendant,
Vickers, was a deputy sheriff in Coffee County, Georgia, who intentionally fired his gun at a dog
and inadvertently shot Corbitt’s ten-year-old son, SDC, wounding him. As the officers
approached the residence, they instructed all those in the area to get down on the ground.
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Then, “while the children were lying on the ground obeying [Vickers’s] orders . . .
without necessity or any immediate threat or cause, [Vickers] discharged his firearm at
the family pet named ‘Bruce’ twice.” The first shot missed, and Bruce (a dog)
temporarily retreated under Corbitt’s home. No other efforts were made to restrain or
subdue the dog, and no one appeared threatened by him. Eight or ten seconds after
Vickers fired the first shot, the dog reappeared and was “approaching his owners,” when
Vickers fired a second shot at the dog. This shot also missed the dog, but the bullet struck
SDC in the back of his right knee. At the time of the shot, SDC was “readily viewable”
and resting “approximately eighteen inches from . . . Vickers, lying on the ground, face
down, pursuant to the orders of [Vickers]” (p. 3; italics added).
When the case was initially heard in 2014, Vickers filed a motion for dismissal on the
grounds of qualified immunity but was denied. However, when the case was eventually heard by
the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed, and Vickers was granted his
qualified immunity; the argument being that Vickers had not violated any clearly established
rights. Vickers was granted qualified immunity because there was nothing established that could
condemn his actions. This case is similar to what happened to Malaika Brooks (mentioned in
Chapter 2 of this thesis) in that an officer was granted qualified immunity due to a lack of a
policy condemning such actions.
Considering cases like that of Corbitt, conflict theorists could hypothesize that qualified
immunity is written in a way that provides loopholes for officers, while also providing minimal
effort to correct or hold the officer accountable for their behavior. The added clause of
specificity also provides a loophole, as changing a detail in the slightest can trigger a new
precedent. If another officer was involved in an incident similar to that of Vickers, but instead of
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the gunshot hitting a minor adjacent to him, the shot entered a neighboring yard a struck
someone. That officer could then argue that since his actions did not match Vickers’s actions to
the letter, he should be protected by qualified immunity.
In sum, conflict theory might be best used to understand not only the creation of the
qualified immunity law but also its use and support for its use, specifically as it pertains to race
and in the context of law enforcement. This is the matter at hand that this thesis will attend to in
the subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Methods
Current Study
Considering the recency of the qualified immunity debate, literature from a social science
standpoint is close to nonexistent. Qualified immunity is more of a legal concept applicable to
entities outside of law enforcement, so it is understandable that the literature surrounding it is
lacking. As a pioneer of this research, I am presented with a tremendous opportunity to expand
research on qualified immunity from a social sciences point of view; especially addressing how it
is implied empirically. This study seeks to answer the following questions:
Research question 1: What is the current level of support for qualified immunity in
the context of policing?
Research question 2: Does the race of the officer or civilian in a traffic interaction
affect public opinion on the applicability of qualified immunity to law enforcement?
Research question 3: What matters more to the public: the race of the officer or the
race of the driver in a traffic interaction?
Based on how the experiment is designed, I have developed the following hypotheses:
H0: Manipulating the races will have no significant effect on participants' opinions on the
scenarios.
H01: Overall, qualified immunity for law enforcement will be viewed with support by the
public.
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H02: Those with a white driver will significantly condemn the actions (i.e., deem these
actions as more unacceptable, more likely to view the actions as criminal, more likely to
view the actions as warranting of a lawsuit by the driver/family of the driver) of the
officer compared to that of a black driver.
H03: The presence of a white officer in an encounter, as opposed to a black officer, will
result in greater support for the officer's actions (i.e., deem these actions as more
unacceptable, more likely to view the actions as criminal, more likely to view the actions
as warranting of a lawsuit by the driver/family of the driver).
H04: The race of the respondent will significantly affect the support for qualified
immunity.
Data
The data used in this thesis came from a national-level survey carried out between
October 3 and 4, 2020, using Amazon’s MTurk program. As part of a larger project, the survey
included questions pertaining to several criminal justice topics, including qualified immunity.
Furthermore, this convenience sample contained an experimental vignette, which included
random assignment to elements within the experiment. Participants were given a scenario in
which an officer pulls over a male community member and asks the driver to step out of the
vehicle. The race of the officer, the race of the community member and what happens after the
driver is asked to step out of the vehicle are randomly assigned. A total of N = 923 respondents
completed this survey.
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Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable contained the definition of qualified immunity established by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), along with the arguments for those who favor it or oppose it, to
ensure all participants have a working knowledge of the concept. The question associated with
this asked the participants whether they favor or oppose qualified immunity and included a
“don’t know” option.
Following the experimental manipulation described above, a series of follow-up
questions were asked. The first question asked the participants if they deemed the officer’s
behavior acceptable using a 5-item continuous scale ranging from 1 = “acceptable” to 5 =
“unacceptable.”
The second follow-up question asked if they thought the officer’s behavior should be a
crime in a dichotomous “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0). This also contained a contingency question. If
participants answered “yes,” they were instructed to indicate what the punishment should be for
the officer. Response options to this contingency question used a 5-item scale ranging from a
fine/probation (= 1) to more than 10 years in prison (= 5).
The final follow-up question asked all participants if they thought the driver/his family
should be able to sue the officer, with response options of “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0). This is an
especially necessary question because qualified immunity is what can block the driver/his family
from filing such a lawsuit.
Independent Variables
Preceding the question about qualified immunity are two questions meant to gauge the
participants’ opinions of police legitimacy and willingness to call the police. The former is
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measured by a series of 6 statements about police legitimacy in a random order in which
participants indicated their agreement on a 5-item scale ranging from “strongly agree” (= 5) to
“strongly disagree” (= 1); the latter is measured by a series of 8 statements in a random order in
which indicated their likeliness to call the police on a 4-item scale ranging from “extremely
unlikely” (= 1) to “extremely likely” (= 4).
Participants were then presented with the experimental vignette with three key elements
manipulated. The experimental question reads as follows:
A [Manipulation A] male officer conducts a traffic stop in which the driver, a
[Manipulation B] male community member, was speeding 10 miles over the speed limit.
When the officer asks the driver to step out of the vehicle [Manipulation C]
All three manipulations were filled in randomly for the participants. Manipulations A
and B indicated whether the individual was either “white” or “black” while Manipulation C
presented one of four different outcomes:
(1) the driver complies and verbally consents to a search of their vehicle. While
searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests the driver
(2) the driver resists leading to the officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle.
In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends up shooting and killing the driver
(3) the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed in
handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; or
(4) the driver resists the request and instead reaches for a handgun that is visibly laying
on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and killing the driver.
In all, there were 12 possible combinations participants were presented with; each combination
was potentially shown approximately 77 times.
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Control Variables
At the conclusion of the survey, participants were asked a series of personal questions.
They were first asked their year of birth, which was used to determine the participants’ age by
taking the difference between their answer and 2020. Next, they were asked about their highest
level of education with options ranging from “less than high school” (= 1) to a “doctoral degree”
(= 7). They were then asked about their race. Initially, the response options were White, Black
or African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander, Hispanic/Latino, Middle Eastern, Mixed Race, or Other, but based on the data, the
responses were consolidated to [white, black, Hispanic and other; or white and non-white]. Sex
is the final question, with options of male, female, and other.
Following the se questions, participants were asked to indicate their income from the
previous year (or their best guess) before taxes, measured on a 7-item scale with ranges spanning
from 0 to $9,999 (= 1) to $100,00+ (= 7). Additionally, respondents were asked about their level
of employment, which was initially measured as full-time, part-time, temporarily laid off,
unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemaker, student, or other, but they were
consolidated to full-time vs everything else. These questions were included because the level of
police interaction can vary across different tax brackets and sociodemographic characteristics.
Participants were also asked if they were employed within the criminal justice (i.e., law
enforcement, courts, corrections) using response options of “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0). As one
can gather, being an employee of the criminal justice system can alter one’s opinions of law
enforcement and their behavior. Similar logic can be applied to the next question, which asked
the participants if they had (1) taken college classes about criminology or the criminal justice
system, (2) been a victim of a crime, (3) been arrested, (4) been convicted of a criminal offense,
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and (5) to carry out a sentence in a jail or prison; all of these provided response options of “yes”
(= 1) or “no” (= 0).
Participants were also asked about their marital status. Originally, the options presented
were single, never married; married, living with spouse; cohabitating, separated, divorced,
widowed, and domestic partnership, but these will be consolidated to married vs everything else.
Perhaps the most telling of the control variables is the question about the racial
composition of the participants’ neighborhoods (primarily, the percentage of African American
residents). Respondents self-identified their neighborhood’s racial composition as nearly all
residents are Black (≥90%; = 1), a majority are Black (>50%; = 2), the neighborhood has a mix
of people (between 25% and 50%; = 3), and nearly all residents are non-Black (≤10%; = 4).
Finally, participants were asked about their political viewpoint and affiliation. The
former was measured on a 6-item scale ranging from very liberal (= 1) to very conservative (= 5)
(with a “not sure” option; = 6); the latter was also asked on a 6-item scale with the options
Republican, Democrat, Independent, Not sure, No preference, Other. Going forward, the latter
variable will be consolidated to Republican vs everything else as, lately, there has been division
in the support for the retention of qualified immunity from within the Republican party (Carney,
2020).
Analytic Plan
The analysis will begin with a descriptive look at the dependent variables. Next, I will
look at the bivariate relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables with
specific attention to the impact of the respondent’s race on the four dependent variables. Finally,
I will conduct a multivariate analysis. Because the first follow-up question and the contingency
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question are measured as continuous variables, multivariate analyses of these questions will be
analyzed through an OLS-regression, while follow-up questions 2 and 3, which were
dichotomous in nature, will be examined through logistic regression.

36

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Results
To determine the support for qualified immunity and the role race plays in its support, the
data was analyzed in three phases. First, I assess the descriptive statistics of the sample,
specifically attending to its sociodemographic characteristics. Second, bivariate statistics explore
the relationship between race and the key dependent variables. Finally, using multivariate
modeling (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic), I examine the relationship between race
and the key dependent variables after accounting for sociodemographic characteristics and
related experimental manipulations.
Descriptive Statistics
After listwise deletion of those who answered “Don’t Know” to whether they support
qualified immunity, the N was reduced from 924 to 840 participants. Of those 840, about half
(49.76%) answered that they favored qualified immunity (see Table 2). Before participants were
presented with the information about qualified immunity, they were first asked questions to
gauge their existing level of police legitimacy and cooperation with police. The average
response for police legitimacy (3.41) indicates an indifference or slight agreement in police
legitimacy, with a standard deviation of 0.99. Responses for cooperation with police follow a
similar pattern. With a mean of 3.12 and a standard deviation of 0.56, the average participant is
somewhat likely to call the police.
Demographically, respondents were in between the ages of 20 and 75 (mean=38.81;
SD=11.26), were, on average, college educated (mean=4.78; SD=1.16), earned an average of
$40,000-$59,999 a year (mean=4.14; SD=1.38), and expressed a liberal-to-moderate political
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES

MEAN|%

RANGE

49.76%
3.34
22.5%
10.95%
8.57%
25.95%
32.02%
66.19%
2.47
25.72%
27.52%
29.14%
9.35%
8.27%
70.68%

STANDARD
DEVIATION
-1.56
------1.2
-------

Favored qualified immunity?
Acceptable behavior?
Acceptable
Slightly Acceptable
Neither Acceptable nor Unacceptable
Slightly Unacceptable
Unacceptable
Crime? (yes)
If so, punishment?
Fine/probation
1 year
5 years
10 years
10+ years
Lawsuit? (yes)
Age
Education
Race (white)
Sex (female)
Income
Employment (full-time)
CJS Employment
Marital Status (married)
Residential Race Composition
Nearly All Black (90+%)
Majority Black (> 50%)
Mix (25% < x < 50%)
Non-Black (< 10%)
Political Viewpoint
Political Affiliation (Republican)
Police Legitimacy
Cooperation with Police

38.81
4.78
71.67%
36.07%
4.14
83.81%
28.92%
64.44%

11.26
1.16
--1.38
----

10.12%
17.26%
34.88%
37.77%
2.94
39.17%
3.41
3.12

----1.29
-0.99
0.56

20-75
2-7
0-1
0-1
1-7
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1

0-1
1-5

0-1
1-5

0-1

1-5
0-1
1-5
1-4
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viewpoint (mean=2.94; SD=1.29). Moreover, the population was 71.67% white, 36.07% female,
83.81% employed full-time—28.92% employed in the criminal justice system—64.44% married,
and 39.17% self-identified as Republican. In terms of residential race composition, 10.12%
lived in a “nearly all black” neighborhood, 17.26% lived in a majority black neighborhood,
34.88% lived in a mixed neighborhood, and 37.77% lived in a non-black neighborhood.
The vignettes had 12 possible combinations, all assigned at random. Table 3 shows a full
breakdown of the frequency in which each combination was answered. When presented with the
experimental vignette and subsequent follow-up questions, the average participant found the
officer’s behavior to be neither acceptable nor unacceptable (mean of 3.34; SD = 1.56), but
32.02% found the behavior unacceptable. The following question—asking if the officer’s
behavior should be criminal—yielded a “yes” from 66.19% of the population. Of that sample,
the average participant thought the behavior warranted a punishment of 5 years in prison (mean
of 2.47), with only 18.62% choosing a sentence greater than or equal to 10 years in prison. After
consideration of the scenarios, 70.68% thought the officer should be sued by the driver or his
family.
Bivariate Statistics
To answer how respondent race affects favoring qualified immunity and the answers to
the vignette follow-up questions, responses to each question was compared for white and nonwhite respondents. In response to favoring qualified immunity, just under half of white and nonwhite respondents (49.83% and 49.58% respectively) favored qualified immunity (see Table 4).
These differences were not statistically significantly different.
In response to acceptability of behavior, white respondents answered “acceptable”
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Table 3: Sample Size for Intersection of Vignette Variables
Officer/Driver Combination

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

White Officer/White Driver

45

44

58

63

White Officer/Black Driver

55

54

47

62

Black Officer/White Driver

50

37

50

56

Black Officer/Black Driver

54

53

55

57

Note: Scenarios
1. the driver complies and verbally consents to a search of their vehicle. While searching,
the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests the driver
2. the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed in handcuffs,
and taken to jail for resisting arrest
3. the driver resists leading to the officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In
the midst of the scuffle the officer ends up shooting and killing the driver
4. the driver resists this request and instead reaches for a handgun that is visibly laying on
the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and killing the driver
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Table 4: Bivariate Relationship between Favoring Qualified Immunity and Respondent Race
Race

No

Yes

Non-White

120 (50.42%)

118 (49.58%)

White

302 (50.17%)

300 (49.83%)

Note: x2=0; p = 1
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22.42% of the time, “slightly acceptable’ 12.13% of the time, “neither acceptable nor
unacceptable” 8.97% of the time, “slightly unacceptable” 24.42% of the time, and
“unacceptable” 30.06% of the time. Non-white respondents answered “acceptable” 17.65% of
the time, “slightly acceptable’ 7.98% of the time, “neither acceptable nor unacceptable” 7.56%
of the time, “slightly unacceptable” 29.83% of the time, and “unacceptable” 36.97% of the time
(see Table 5). The differences in response are statistically significant with a 99% confidence
interval.
Over half of white and non-white respondents (64.12% and 71.43%, respectively)
indicated that they believed the officer’s behavior to be a crime, which were not statistically
significantly different (see Table 6). In response to what the punishment should be, white
respondents answered “fine/probation” 27.46% of the time, “1 year incarceration” 25.13% of the
time, “5 years incarceration” 27.20% of the time, “10 years incarceration” 11.92% of the time,
and 10+ years incarceration” 8.29% of the time. Non-white respondents answered
“fine/probation” 21.76% of the time, “1 year incarceration” 32.94% of the time, “5 years
incarceration” 33.53% of the time, “10 years incarceration” 3.53% of the time, and 10+ years
incarceration” 8.24% of the time. The differences in response are statistically significant with a
99.9% confidence interval (see Table 7). Regarding whether a lawsuit should be filed, over half
of white and non-white respondents (67.39% and 78.99%, respectively) said that the officer
should be sued for his actions. These differences were also significant with a 99.9% confidence
interval (see Table 8).
Multivariate Statistics
For this part of the analysis, each dependent variable (favoring qualified immunity and
the vignette follow-up questions) was examined across each independent and control variable to
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Table 5: Bivariate Relationship between Acceptability of Officer Behavior and Respondent Race
Race

Non-

Acceptable

Slightly
acceptable

Neither
acceptable nor
unacceptable

Slightly
unacceptable

Unacceptable

42 (17.65%)

19 (7.98%)

18 (7.56%)

71 (29.83%)

88 (36.97%)

147 (24.42%)

73 (12.13%)

54 (8.97%)

147 (24.42%)

181 (30.06%)

white
White

Note: t = -46.8; p < .001
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Table 6: Bivariate Relationship between “Should it be a crime?” and Respondent Race
Race

No

Yes

Non-White

68 (28.57%)

170 (71.43%)

White

216 (35.88%)

386 (64.12%)

Note: x2 = 3.752; p = 0.053
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Table 7: Bivariate Relationship between Punishment and Respondent Race
Race

Fine/probation

1 year
incarceration

5 years
incarceration

10 years
incarceration

10+ years
incarceration

NonWhite

37 (21.76%)

56 (32.94%)

57 (33.53%)

6 (3.53%)

14 (8.24%)

White

106 (27.46%)

97 (25.13%)

105 (27.20%)

46 (11.92%)

32 (8.29%)

Note: t = -32.838; p < .001
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Table 8: Bivariate Relationship between Ability to Sue and Respondent Race
Race
Non-White

No
50 (21.01%)

Yes
188 (78.99%)

White

196 (32.61%)

405 (67.39%)

Note: x2 = 10.524; p = 0.001
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see which variables affected the answers to those questions. This was done over a series of
models for each dependent variable, with each model adding more variables to the equation.
Model 1 (except for “favoring qualified immunity,” which skips to Model 2) only considers the
vignette manipulations (race of the officer, race of the driver, and the scenario) and how each
option affected the answer. Model 2 adds the race of the respondent to the equation along with
the vignette manipulations. Model 3 adds in the rest of the control variables.
For the dependent variable of favoring qualified immunity, the models show respondent
race becoming significant when moving from Model 1 to Model 2 (see Table 9). When
considering every variable (Model 2), the following variables showed a significant effect in how
one favored qualified immunity: race, education, income, CJS employment, marital status,
political viewpoint, political affiliation, police legitimacy, and cooperation with police. Of note,
those married, compared to all others, were over twice as likely (odds ratio [OR] = 2.132) to
favor qualified immunity, which was the largest effect in this model.
For the dependent variable of acceptability of the officer’s behavior in the vignette,
neither the race of the officer nor the race of the driver significantly affected the results; only
scenarios 2 and 3 compared to scenario 1 were statistically significant (99.9% confidence) in the
first model (see Table 10). Compared to scenario 1, those viewing the other scenarios found the
officer’s behavior more unacceptable. When race of the respondent was added, it too was
statistically significant (95% confidence)—along with scenarios 2 and 3—and had a negative
relationship with acceptability. However, respondent race is no longer significant when the
remaining variables are added to the model (Model 3). The following variables showed
significance in Model 3: age, sex, income, CJS employment, marital status, residential race
composition, political viewpoint, police legitimacy, and cooperation with police. Notably, it can
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis: Favoring Qualified Immunity
MODEL 1

MODEL 2

b

SE

OR

b

0.010
-----

0.153
-----

1.010
-----

0.570
--0.010
0.214
-0.202

0.196
-0.007
0.082
0.170

1.768**
-0.990
1.250**
0.815

Income

--

--

--

-0.142

0.066

0.871*

Employment

--

--

--

-0.294

0.247

0.743

CJS Employment

--

--

--

0.481

0.202

1.625*

Marital Status

--

--

--

0.761

0.192

2.132***

Residential Race
Composition
Political Viewpoint

--

--

--

-0.184

0.097

0.834

--

--

--

0.249

0.070

1.277***

Political Affiliation

--

--

--

0.457

0.178

1.586**

Police Legitimacy

--

--

--

0.559

0.096

1.744***

Cooperation with Police

--

--

--

0.409

0.168

1.511*

-0.017

0.130

0.983

-4.369

0.768

0.012***

Race
White
Non-White (ref.)
Age
Education
Sex (female)

Constant
McFadden R-Squared

Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

3.782x10-6

SE

0.193

OR
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Table 10: Multivariate Analysis | Acceptability of Police Behavior

Manipulation A
White (ref.)
Black
Manipulation B
White (ref.)
Black
Manipulation C
Scenario 1 (ref.)
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Race
White
Non-White (ref.)
Age
Education
Sex
Income
Employment
CJS Employment
Marital Status
Residential Race
Composition
Political Viewpoint
Political Affiliation
Police Legitimacy
Cooperation with
Police
Constant
Adjusted R-Squared

MODEL 1
b
SE
β
--0.129 0.097

MODEL 2
b
SE
β

MODEL 3
b
SE

β

-0.041

--0.121 0.096

-0.039

-0.145

-0.087

-0.047

----0.047 0.097 -0.015

---0.038 0.097

--0.012

--0.037

-0.087

--0.012

---0.380*** -1.413
-0.426*** -1.455
-0.061 -0.200

-0.127
0.124
0.120

--0.378***
-0.403***
-0.058

-0.074*
----------

0.120
--0.008
-0.021
-0.382
-0.083
0.091
0.493
0.295
-0.245

0.103
-0.004
0.044
0.092
0.035
0.130
0.114
0.106
0.053

0.035
--0.058*
-0.016
-0.117***
-0.073*
0.022
0.143***
0.091**
-0.153***

-----

0.111
0.034
0.164
0.269

0.038
0.102
0.052
0.089

0.092**
0.011
0.104**
0.096**

--

3.418

0.396
0.360

------1.431 0.142 -0.382*** -1.423 0.141
-1.566 0.138 -0.435*** -1.535 0.138
-0.224 0.134 -0.065
-0.213 0.133
-----------

-----------

-----------

-----

-----

-----

4.077 0.121
0.196

--

-0.258 0.107
-----------------------

-----

4.248 0.140
0.201

--

Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and
killing the driver.
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be said with 99.9% confidence that being a CJS employee leads to a 0.143 increase in the
acceptability of the officer’s behavior.
When determining the criminality of the officer in the vignette, once again, the race of
the officer and driver were not statistically significant (see Table 11). Scenarios 2 and 3,
compared to scenario 1, remained significant across all three models (99.9% confidence) while
scenario 4 was slightly significant (95% confidence) in Model 2. By Model 3, those that viewed
scenario 2 were 9.629 times more likely than those who had scenario 1 to find the officer’s
behavior to be a crime; those that had scenario 3 were 7.336 times more likely. Like the
previous dependent variable, the race of the respondent was significant in Model 2 (99%
confidence), but not for Model 3. The following variables were also significant in Model 3:
education, sex, CJS employment, and residential race composition. Once again, CJS
employment stands out the most, because those employees were 3.104 times more likely to find
the officer’s behavior to be a crime.
For the dependent variable of punishment, the pattern of nonsignificant values for
Manipulations A and B continues across this variable as well (see Table 12). Scenarios 2, 3, and
4, compared to scenario 1, were all statistically significantly different (95%, 99.9%, and 99%
confidence) with scenario 2 gaining an increase in significance in Model 3 (97.5%). Notably,
compared to scenario 1, scenario 2 was the only one to have a negative odds ratio, suggesting a
preference for less punitiveness than the officer in scenario 1. With this dependent variable, race
of the respondent was not significant in either model it was included. Of the control variables in
Model 3, only residential race composition and cooperation with police were statistically
significant. Moreover, residential race composition carries a positive relationship while
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Table 11: Multivariate Analysis | Is it a crime?
MODEL 1
b
Manipulation A
White (ref.)
Black
Manipulation B
White (ref.)
Black
Manipulation C
Scenario 1 (ref.)
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Race
White
Non-White (ref.)
Age
Education
Sex
Income
Employment
CJS Employment
Marital Status
Residential Race
Composition
Political Viewpoint
Political Affiliation
Police Legitimacy
Cooperation with
Police
Constant
McFadden R-Squared

MODEL 2

SE

OR

--0.003

-0.156

--0.074
-2.055
1.621
0.360

MODEL 3

b

SE

OR

b

SE

OR

-0.997

--0.019

-0.157

-0.981

--0.081

-0.174

-0.922

-0.157

-0.928

--0.064

-0.158

-0.938

-0.113

-0.174

-1.119

-0.257
0.225
0.192

--7.806*** 2.093
5.057*** 1.696
1.433
0.387

-0.259
0.228
0.193

--8.106*** 2.265
5.454*** 1.993
1.472* 0.409

-0.279
0.254
0.216

-9.629***
7.336***
1.505

0.603** -0.016
----0.010

0.210
-0.008

0.984
-0.990

----

----

----

-0.505
---

0.180
---

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

0.336
0.568
-0.021
-0.189
1.133
0.115
-0.388

0.084
0.186
0.067
0.255
0.245
0.204
0.111

1.399***
1.765**
0.979
0.828
3.104***
1.123
0.679***

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-0.091
0.097
-0.189
-0.251

0.079
0.207
0.104
0.174

0.913
1.102
0.828
0.778

0.181

0.873

0.202

0.219

1.224

1.041

0.772

2.832

-0.136

0.106

0.114

0.231

Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and
killing the driver.
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Table 12: Multivariate Analysis | Punishment
MODEL 1
b
Manipulation A
White (ref.)
-Black
-0.135
Manipulation B
White (ref.)
-Black
0.051
Manipulation C
Scenario 1 (ref.)
-Scenario 2
-0.306
Scenario 3
1.029
Scenario 4
0.430
Race
White
-Non-White (ref.)
-Age
-Education
Sex
Income
Employment
CJS Employment
Marital Status
Residential Race
Composition
Political
Viewpoint
Political
Affiliation
Police Legitimacy
Cooperation with
Police
Constant
Adjusted RSquared

SE

MODEL 2
β

MODEL 3

b

SE

β

--0.139

-0.092

--0.058

-0.054

-0.092

-0.023

---0.140 -0.116* -0.296
0.139 0.394*** 1.045
0.147 0.151** 0.435

--0.092 -0.056
-0.092

-0.021

-0.067
---

b

SE

β

--0.141

-0.091

--0.059

-0.090

-0.091

-0.037

-0.141
0.141
0.147

---0.112* -0.386
0.400*** 0.943
0.153** 0.408

-0.141
0.142
0.144

--0.146**
0.360***
0.144**

0.101
---

-0.026
---

-0.205
--0.005

0.106
-0.004

-0.078
--0.043

----

----

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

-0.002
-0.007
0.035
0.173
-0.138
-0.026
0.114

0.051
0.094
0.037
0.142
0.110
0.114
0.055

-0.001
-0.003
0.038
0.050
-0.055
-0.102
0.095*

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.052

0.038

-0.057

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.012

0.106

-0.005

---

---

---

---

---

---

-0.088
-0.213

0.056
0.095

-0.071
-0.096*

2.184

0.130
0.195

--

2.222

0.142
0.194

--

3.122

0.431
0.235

--

Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and
killing the driver.
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cooperation with police carries a negative relationship; neither were substantively large in
magnitude.
The final dependent variable in this analysis involved whether the driver or his family
should be able to sue the officer. As with the previous models, Manipulations A and B were not
statistically significant. Scenarios 2, 3, and 4, compared to scenario 1, consistently showed
statistical significance across all 3 models (see Table 13). The odds that those who had scenarios
2-4 favored the driver/his family being able to sue the officer show a positive relationship with
tremendous difference. In Model 3, it is said with 99.9% confidence that those who had scenario
2 were 12.198 times more likely than those with scenario 1 to favor the driver/his family being
able to sue the officer; scenario 3 carried an odds ratio of 9.885. Race of the respondent follows
the pattern of being significant in Model 2 (99.9% confidence) but not Model 3. The remaining
significant variables are age, education, CJS employment, marital status, residential race
composition, and police legitimacy. CJS employment continues to stand out as employees were
3.608 times more likely to favor the ability to sue.
Conclusion
In sum, it was found that about half of the population favored qualified immunity, but
when applied to the vignettes, over 70% believed that the driver/his family should be able to sue
the officer for his actions during the traffic stop. Moreover, it was shown that the neither the
race of the officer nor the race of the driver significantly affected responses for any of the
dependent variables. An especially significant finding comes from CJS employment, as the
impact of such employment continued to stand out among the control variables. The next
chapter will discuss these findings and the possible implications of this data.
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Table 13: Multivariate Analysis | Ability to Sue
MODEL 1
b
Manipulation A
White (ref.)
-Black
-0.087
Manipulation B
White (ref.)
-Black
-0.229
Manipulation C
Scenario 1 (ref.)
-Scenario 2
2.115
Scenario 3
1.703
Scenario 4
0.536
Race
White
-Non-White (ref.)
-Age
-Education
-Sex
-Income
-Employment
CJS Employment
Marital Status
Residential Race
Composition
Political
Viewpoint
Political
Affiliation
Police Legitimacy
Cooperation with
Police
Constant
McFadden RSquared

MODEL 2
b

SE

MODEL 3

SE

OR

-0.162

-0.917

---0.114 0.164

-0.892

-0.163

-0.796

---0.220 0.165

-0.802

-0.271
0.236
0.194

-8.286***
5.490***
1.710**

--2.192 0.275
1.838 0.242
0.590 0.198
-0.815 0.195
-----------

OR

SE

OR

--0.205

-0.186

-0.815

--0.046

-0.186

-0.955

-2.501
2.291
0.691

-0.307
0.277
0.228

-12.198***
9.885***
1.995**

0.443*** -0.283
----0.021
-0.241
-0.240
--0.095

0.228
-0.009
0.087
0.197
0.072

0.753
-0.979*
1.273**
1.271
0.910

-8.952***
6.285***
1.804**

b

-------

-------

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-0.022
1.283
0.617
-0.420

0.265
0.282
0.217
0.121

0.978
3.608***
1.853**
0.657***

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.133

0.087

0.876

--

--

--

--

--

--

0.356

0.227

1.428

---

---

---

---

---

---

-0.345
-0.340

0.113
0.186

0.708**
0.712

0.137

0.184
0.106

1.146

3.278

0.842
0.276

26.511***

0.690 0.231
0.124

1.994**

Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and
killing the driver.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
Discussion
The data collected from this survey has provided information that can provide a new
perspective on qualified immunity. As the concept is primarily discussed in law reviews, data on
the applicability to real-world situations was lacking. In this section, I will discuss these findings
in more detail and show just what the population had to say about it.
Research Questions
To reiterate, the first research question asked, “What is the current level of support for
qualified immunity in the context of policing?” Based on the data, the population is split on
favoring qualified immunity in that context (see Table 2). When examined with multivariate
models, every sociodemographic characteristic, with the exception of income (negative and
significantly related), age, sex, employment, and residential racial composition, signified an
increase in favorability, with the respondents’ race, marital status, and views on police
legitimacy being the most significant (see Table 9). This suggests that race plays a role in
support for qualified immunity as White respondents favored it more than the non-White
respondents.
The second research question asked, “Does the race of the officer or civilian in a traffic
interaction affect public opinion on the applicability of qualified immunity to law enforcement?”
To answer this question, one must break down the applicability of qualified immunity into the
variables of acceptability of officer behavior and that of the driver/his family being able to sue
the officer. In both cases, the race of the officer (Manipulation A in the vignette) was not
statistically significantly different. This means that the opinions of those assigned to a black
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officer vignette did not vary enough from those assigned to a white officer to say that the
officer’s race affected them (see Tables 10 and 13).
The final research question reads, “What matters more to the public: the race of the
officer or the race of the driver in a traffic interaction?” Due to a lack of significance from either
variable in any of the multivariate analyses, it is difficult to say which matters more. Moreover,
the race of the driver and the race of the officer coefficients across all models were not
statistically significantly different from each other per Paternoster et. al.’s (1998) equality of
coefficients test.
Hypotheses
Throughout this study, I have been working under the null hypothesis that manipulating
the races of the officer and driver will have no significant effects on participants’ opinions on the
scenarios. Based on multivariate analyses, I can conclude that the data supports the null
hypothesis. Neither Manipulation A (race of the officer) nor Manipulation B (race of the driver)
yielded significant results for any of the follow-up question/dependent variables (see Tables 1013).
The next hypothesis addresses the support for qualified immunity. I hypothesized that
there would be an overall support, however, the data does not support this hypothesis. As Table
2 shows, there is only a 49.76% support for qualified immunity applying to law enforcement.
However, it is worth noting that White respondents were 1.768 times more likely to favor
qualified immunity than their non-White counterparts, which can be said with 99% confidence.
(see Table 9). Given that White respondents were almost twice as likely to favor qualified
immunity (see Table 9), the connection to conflict theory is strengthened, as those who are in
power (i.e., Whites) are favoring a policy that benefits them (or rather hinders someone other
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than them). Relatedly, those working in the CJS system stand to gain the most from the qualified
immunity and are 1.65 times more likely to favor it, which is statistically significant (another nod
to conflict theory). Yet, in conflict with the principles of conflict theory, they were also more
likely to favor allowing the driver or the driver’s family the ability to sue the officer. It is
possible that their intimate knowledge of law enforcement has given them a different expectation
of what an officer is supposed to do. However, future research should explore this supposed
paradox.
The second and third hypotheses address whether having a white driver will lead to more
significant condemnation of the officer’s behavior and that having a white officer would result in
more significant support for the officer’s behavior. Based on the data, neither hypothesis is
supported. As shown previously, across all follow-up question/dependent variables, there is no
significant difference between the races of the officer and driver and how they viewed the
officer’s behavior. There is, however, a significant difference in how what the officer did as part
of Manipulation C and how respondents reacted. Since the scenarios were designed to vary in
levels of justifiability and legality, there were expected differences based on how they were
assigned, and it was made abundantly clear that the (often cop-out) answer of, “It depends on the
situation,” legitimately applies here. Moreover, the differences between scenario 1 and scenarios
2 and 3, especially when determining if the officer’s behavior was a crime (see Table 11) and if
the driver/his family should be able to sue (see Table 13) showed that those who were assigned
scenarios 2 and 3 yielded an OR of at least 7 for both variables. However, the ORs for scenario
3 were less than those of scenario 2, despite scenario 3 involving the driver dying. This means
that the participants were less likely to find the officer shooting the suspect as a crime than they
would if the officer threw down the driver and arrested him for resisting.
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The final hypothesis addresses whether the race of the respondent significantly affects
support for qualified immunity. Based on the data shown in Table 9, race alone does not
significantly affect support, however, when the control variables are added, race then becomes
significant. Conversely, the race of the respondent developed a pattern of being significant when
examined alongside only the experimental manipulations when used as a predictor for the
follow-up question/dependent variables, but loses its significance when the rest of the control
variables are accounted for (except for the dependent variable of the officer’s punishment in
which race was nonsignificant).
Limitations
The first limitation to this study involves the vignette scenarios from Manipulation C.
Due to the unpredictable nature of policing, it proved impossible to capture every police
interaction within just four pre-made scenarios. Such a limitation has hindered the level of
generalizability of this study.
Along the same line, the vignettes were designed to mirror real-world situations. This,
coupled with the timing of the distribution of this survey (five months following the death of
George Floyd), could have emotionally charged the respondents and altered their responses.
However, it is impossible to determine this role of emotions in rating these scenarios. At best, it
can be presumed that, based on the random assignment of these scenarios to respondents, the
emotional responses from such historical events were evenly distributed across scenarios and
thus likely played not significant role.
As shown in the analyses, the most significant variable from the vignette was
Manipulation C; the scenarios mattered the most to respondents when they answered the followup questions. The limitation comes in when considering if the vignette affected respondents’
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opinions on qualified immunity after the fact. A preliminary opinion was gathered but there was
no explicit question addressing how the vignette may have changed their minds. Future research
may wish to explore this impact.
Implications
With the recent attention given by lawmakers to qualified immunity (Lacy, 2021), this
study can be used to gain a better perspective on the state of the civilian’s support for the policy.
The near 50/50 split in support for qualified immunity, as shown in this survey, points to a
possible inflection point in a possible abolition of the protections of qualified immunity. Recent
events have shown that the scales are being tipped towards abolition as New York City (Romine,
2021) and New Mexico have joined Colorado in ending qualified immunity for law enforcement
(NM ended it altogether; Williams, 2021). Moreover, the multivariate analysis point to a
potential racial division after accounting for other theoretical and sociodemographic factors.
Thus, policymakers may wish to be attuned to such differences.
While being sued is one form of accountability for law enforcement, the other side (or
addition) to that is criminal punishment. The important aspect of that is how long they are
punished for. The data from this study shows that the population averages a support for the
officer to be punished for up to 5 years in prison, with statistically significant movement towards
the 10-year option in scenario 3 (see Table 12). Keeping with that scenario, the driver was killed
by the officer in that scenario, and the data shows that those who were assigned to that scenario
were over 7 times as likely to find his actions criminal, yet they only recommended 5-10 years in
prison. That is less time than the average prison sentence for a manslaughter charge. This level
punitiveness could come off as leniency because they are police officers.
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Additionally, future researchers find it fruitful to examine how Criminal Justice System
employees view qualified immunity. In this study, they were 1.65 times more likely to favor it
but were also more likely to favor allowing the driver or the driver’s family the ability to sue the
officer.
Future Research
As it pertains to qualified immunity, this study is only the beginning. There are several
avenues that have been opened because of this research.
The CJS employees’ responses stood out to me as I conducted the analysis. Less than
30% of the respondents were employed by the CJS, yet that sample yielded statistically
significant differences in all but one multivariate analysis. In the future lies the potential to
gather the thoughts of exclusively CJS employees to gain a better perspective, perhaps through a
qualitative or mixed methods study.
Now that it has been revealed that is really does depend on the situation, finding out why
would be a logical next step, inquiring on a more intimate level to understand what about the
situations led to the data from this study. Possible studies could include examining the
connection between the punitiveness (or lack thereof) applied to these officers and the level of
support for an officer’s behavior or eliminating race from the vignette altogether and repeating
the experiment.
Taking it a step further, providing video vignettes and comparing the reactions to them to
those of the written vignettes would possibly provide a clearer explanation as to how the
situation affects one’s support for qualified immunity. Since most of the incidents I referenced
in Chapter 1 were caught on video, meeting them on that same level would take the respondent’s
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own imagination out of the equation. Emotion may still play a factor, but a qualitative study can
account for that.

Conclusion
As noted above, the policy of qualified immunity poses a complex problem in law
enforcement, especially when examining this policy through the lens of conflict theory. Although
there may be somewhat mixed support for this policy, the data collected can provide a clearer
picture as to who is supporting it and why. Pioneering a social science point of view on qualified
immunity has given me the opportunity expand on a whole new debate among criminal justice
scholars. Moving forward, I hope to explore other avenues presented by this study to further
understand how the public views qualified immunity.
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